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Pragmatism and the
Analysis of Meaning
in the Philosophy of
Giovanni Vailati

Robert E. Innis

1. INTRODUCTION

Giovanni Vailati's premature death in 1909, at the age of fortysix, silenced a distinctive and original voice in Italian philosophy.
In his work, so different in tone and method from Croce's idealism
and anti-scientism, we find reflected and developed most of the
great problems and themes which have come to the fore in twentieth-century philosophy and semiotics. In spite of his remarkable
linguistic skills, encompassing both modern and classical IanThis essay is taken from part one of my book, Giovanni Vailati:
Pragmatismand theAnalysis of Meaning, to be published in the Foundations
of Semiotics series by John Benjamins in Amsterdam. The book will also
contain translations of Vailati's most important essays on pragmatism
and language theory. A shorter, preliminary version was read at the
American Association for Italian Studies Annual Conference, held at the
University of Lowell, MA, April 14, 1989.
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guages, Vailati's philosophical orientation did not derive directly
from the Italian humanist tradition nor from the Idealist traditions
of German transcendental philosophy. Rather, Vailati was professionally trained in physics and mathematics and had been Peano's
assistant at the University of Torino before becoming a teacher of
mathematics in secondary schools. H. S. Thayer, in his classic
Meaning and Context:A CriticalHistory of Pragmatism,1 said of Vailati
that
his work displays a meeting of intellectual currents that were to
determine the later character of modem philosophy: Peirce's pragmatism and his interest in signs and the analysis of concepts; the
interest of the Vienna Circle, 1923, in formulating the methodology
of verification and a criterion of meaningful (i.e., the cognitive use
of) language; the mathematical, critical, and analytical investigations of language, logic, and science by Ramsey and Wittgenstein.
(332-33)

Into his work-as well as into that of Peirce's, with which it
has an intimate theoretical as well as historical connection-flowed
many of the chief problems and concerns of the whole history of
philosophy and of the sciences, particularly the natural sciences,
and out of it emerged a set of heuristically fertile insights and
proposals that not only anticipated many later discussions and
problems, but still have relevance and importance for our present
situation.
Vailati's philosophical project was nourished most of all by
a deep immersion in the history and methods of the exact sciences-especially
the history of mechanics and the history of
mathematics as paradigms of the deductive sciences-and
by a
recognition of the revolutionary importance of pragmatism and
of the turn toward the analysis of meaning and language that was
one of its central foci. His posthumously collected Scritti, edited
by Mario Calderoni, Umberto Ricci, and Giovanni Vacca (Leipzig
and Florence: Barthes and Seeber, 1911), which includes almost
all his published work (the Scritti has 213 entries), displays a range
of concern, reading, and reference that bears witness to a
philosophical culture of the highest caliber. Vailati's correspondence, a substantial selection of which can be found in his Epistolario, edited by Giorgio Lanaro (Turin: Einaudi, 1971), displays
an extraordinary range of contacts, including exchanges with Vilfredo Pareto, Ernst Mach, Lady Welby, Franz Brentano, Benedetto
Croce, Mario Calderoni, and many others. 2
My highly selective and introductory discussion will be limited
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here to the themes of Vailati's percipient, pragmatically oriented
analysis of modern science from an epistemological, linguistic,
and sense-critical point of view, and his exploration of language
from a critical, analytical, and constructive point of view. The
overarching matrix is Vailati's pragmatism, the inner bond that
connects him with that epochal movement in American philosophy,
and with the relatively short-lived Italian continuation and development of pragmatism in the work of Papini, Calderoni, and
others who collaborated on the Florentine journal Leonardoduring
those fateful years in the first decade of this century, before the
overpowering presences of Croce and Gentile took their toll upon
the diversity of Italian philosophical culture.

2. SCIENCE AND THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF DEDUCTION
(ARISTOTLE, GALILEO, PEIRCE, BERKELEY)

The core of Vailati' s analysis and evaluation of the significance
of modern science, the topic of his spellbinding essay "11metodo
deduttivo come strumento di ricerca" (SF: 59-92), lies in his thesis
that the rise of the modern mathematical natural sciences effected
a pivotal change in the ideal of deduction as a means of knowing.
When Aristotle, Vailati thought, considered the nature and scope
of deduction, he had in mind for the most part deduction in
geometrical demonstrations or in rhetorical argumentations. What
they had in common was their focusing upon a privileged set of
premises or axioms, which were more certain and necessary, and
their use as foundations and bases for the increase of certitude
that would result from the deduction of sets of conclusions from
them. A properly conceived deductive method transmitted certitude from premises to conclusions. Both processes-the
strictly
formal one of geometry and the more informal one of rhetoricwere subject to derailment due to the illusions deriving from the
imperfections of ordinary language, or from what Vailati also called
"il linguaggio comune" (SF: 62). Deduction was to help us to avoid
[evitare]these illusions and to facilitate [facilitare]
reasoning processes
through long chains.
The distinctiveness of the classical view of deduction, in addition to its concern with certitude, was exemplified in the
privileged role played by the premises. They were to be taken as
"given," while deduction itself would show, through inferential
processes, what conclusions were in agreement with them. In
cases of conflict with alternative conclusions resulting from other
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deductive processes, our own premises, as embedded in "linguaggio comune" or "linguaggio ordinario," were authoritative. This
was ultimately the root of the classical reliance upon the "argument
from authority," potentiated to an incredible degree by the Scholastics for whom deduction was first and foremost a "good conductor" [buonaconduttrice]of evidence and certitude (SF: 74). It was
the overuse of this method as a support of dogmatism and
traditionalism that caused Bacon to attack the deductive method
as aprioristic and to oppose to it the ideal of a science based on
induction and practical experiment.
Galilean physics, however, did not wholeheartedly adopt the
Baconian ideal. To be sure, Galileo proceeded deductively, but
his goal was not certitude. Deduction for him, Vailati pointed out,
was rather the means for the "explanation and anticipation of
experience" [spiegazionee anticipazionesull'esperienza](SF: 65). Vailati attempted to encapsulate the radical difference exemplified in
the working out of Galilean methods in a stupendous passage:
The mental processes that make up the most essential part of the
modern methods of explanation and of scientific research, taking,
that is, by means of deduction, theories to their ultimate consequences, for the purpose of confronting them with some fact known
or eventually knowable to be incompatible with it, the utilization
to the highest degree of every known law to see up to what point
it suffices to give an account of all the particulars which are encountered in the facts in which its action is manifested and to establish
what unexplained residuum it still leaves open to our further investigations, the combining of more laws for the purpose of using
them in the analysis of a complicated single phenomenon, all of
these operations, no one of which is possible without the help of
deduction, appear to be completely foreign to the spirit of those
first [scientific] investigators. The dislike of deduction in all the
cases in which it is of no use to prove something of which one was
first in doubt, the inability to avail oneself of it as a means to secure
us against too hasty generalization, increasing in a certain way the
points of contact between each theory and the facts from which it
can await a confirmation or a contradiction, the lack of patience,
and I would say as it were the lack of abnegation, necessary for
drawing out accurately the consequences of hypotheses or principles less intuitive and less solid than those of geometry, laying
oneself open to the risk of obtaining as a unique result of one's own
efforts the conviction of having started from poorly grounded suppositions and of having to redo the same work by taking a different
point of departure, not being satisfied with vague analogies, but
pretending that the agreement, among the phenomena being com-
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pared, is verified down to the most minute particulars accessible
to our senses or to the control of instruments and measurements,
these are so many characters or marks that are connected to the
same above indicated difference, that is, that between the old
methods and those to which are due the instances of rapid progress
of the physical sciences in the last three centuries. (SF: 71-72)

Such is Vailati's delineation of the hypothetical-deductive
method. It consists in "l'attitudine ... a meravigliarsi a proposito"
[the ability ... to be amazed on purpose] (SF: 67), in the movement
from the haphazard interrogation of nature to the provocation of
nature, to subjecting it and the inquirer to risks.
Later in his groundbreaking essay, Vailati offers us another
ringing passage:
It is this reduction of a fact, or of a law, to other more general laws
or facts that constitutes what we call scientificexplanation,and it is
important to note how the advantages inhering in this process do
not depend at all on the circumstances that the facts or the laws,
upon which a given explanation is grounded, are presented to our
mind as more familiar or more evident in themselves than those
that we are explaining by means of them. Deduction, applied in
such a way as a means of explanation, permits us to embrace, with
one glance and with one single act of the mind, a variety and
multiplicity of facts, the consideration of which would demand a
quite large amount of operations and of distinct intellectual efforts.
With its aid we manage to locate ourselves at a point of view from
which the analogies, the relations, and the connections, among the
phenomena that we are investigating, are explained to our intellect
just as the topographical particularities of a region are offered to
the view of one who contemplates them from a high point. Deduction multiplies in this way our abilities to perceive order, uniformity,
constant laws in the midst of the tumultuous succession of facts
and events, or, to say the same thing with an expression from Plato
(Republic,Bk 7), it puts us in a position to discernthe one in the midst
of the many [to en polloisoron] and to discover with the eyes of the
mind the immutable poles around which turn the chaos and the
perpetual comings and goings of phenomena and of sensations.
(SF: 87)

Vailati thought of science in realist terms, in spite of his not
infrequent admiring references to Mach's epistemology. What he
shared with Mach, however, was a profound appreciation of the
role of idealizzazionisemplificatriciin the construction of scientific
theories:
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The ease with which such simplifications lend themselves to bringing us to new conclusions, by means of purely mental operations
and independently of any direct examination of the concrete facts
to which they refer, and the absolute uselessness of any appeal to
these to guarantee the correctness of the deductions themselves,
leads us sometimes to lose from view that requisite investigations
must precede the application of the results obtained to real cases
in order to establish whether, by means of them, the conditions
are truly present that the theory supposes, whether, by means of
them, that is, the influence of all those causes the theory has not
taken into account is then really and truly able to be ignored. (SF: 91)

The modern scientific process of deduction involves a mutual
adjustment of theoretical idealization, chains of deductions, and
the demands of experience itself. From an examination of the
significance of the rise of mechanics, which for him was of fundamental epistemological importance, Vailati contended that concepts are fundamentally instrumental in nature (SF: 55), that an
intellectual combat of ideas takes place not just between thinkers
but within each thinker (SF: 57), that there is an intrinsic aesthetic
character to mechanics that turns theory-construction in this domain into a kind of "scientific poem" (SF: 58), so that coherence,
symmetry, and coordination of ideas are marks of scientific and
theoretical quality. The drive toward simplicity and economy that
Vailati ascribes to the science of mechanics is really the drive
toward system and is not to be thought of in strictly Machian
terms.
Further, Vailati was deeply impressed by Peirce's pragmatic
analysis of meaning and by its connection with the development
of the experimental sciences on the one hand and of mathematical
logic on the other. The Peircean central contention was that the
valoreor significatoof an assertion is to be found in the "practical"
consequences (SF: 237) entailed by it and by its constituent terms.
Vailati will give a faithful and clear account of this pragmatic
maxim in his later essay "Le origini e l'idea fondamentale del
pragmatismo," published in Rivista di psicologiaapplicatain 1909
(in SF: 331-46). But the peculiarity of Vailati's development of a
philosophy of science (and ultimately of a philosophy oflanguage)
within the confines of a pragmatic epistemology is that for him
the premises, postulates, and axioms of a theory are treated as
propositions like other propositions, with no divine right. A theory
as a concatenated network of premises, conclusions, and lines of
inference is to be compared to a constitutional or democratic regime where the postulates are temporarily placed in charge to
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perform certain functions in the public interest, that is, in this
case, the pursuit of objective knowledge. The distinction between
premises and conclusions, on this view, is merely functional or
pragmatic, since in the last analysis all the constituents of the
theoretical system would be bound together in a mutually selfimplicatory way.
Vailati' s antifoundationalism is intrinsically connected with
his pragmatism. For Vailati scientific knowing, while a privileged
form of knowing, is not based on impregnable intuitions or insights. It consists of a vast web of theses and hypotheses that
have been developed from sets of simplifying idealizations and
whose practical (conceptual) consequences have been elaborated
in the greatest detail by complicated chains of inference. As Vailati
put it in his review of Duhem's La theoriephysique (Sf: 220-22), a
theory is "un insieme di ipotesi" (Sf: 222), which, while ideally
confronted with experience as a whole, nevertheless must be put
to the test in individual cases and, perhaps, sacrificed in parts
(Sf: 222) in order to save the theory as a whole. Science is a
systematized form of risk taking, a willingness to fall into error
for the sake of truth. In this conception of science, Vailati was
agreeing with Peirce's characterization of the "experimental mind"
at the beginning of his essay "What Pragmatism Is" (Collected
Papers, 4.530ft), where the provisional character of premises and
postulates is meshed with their heuristic fertility.
A further aspect of this matter, that also looks forward to
Vailati' s analysis of language, is his assertion that the development
of modern mechanics and mathematical logic entails the recognition of the central role of implicitdefinitionor definitionby abstraction
in our ways of talking about and symbolizing the world. The main
point is: we cannot assign a meaning to isolated words. The key
words of a theory-"mass,"
"force," "inertia," and so forth-are
defined within the contexts of sentences or assertions. They are
not independent contents of abstracted or abstractable intelligibilities but elements within a complex system of differences,
connections, and contrasts:
It is necessary then to admit that a theory, or a collection of hypotheses, can have a meaning even when we cannot properly attribute
one to the individual parts, or affirmations, that contribute to its
constitution: in the same way that a phrase can have a determinate
sense without that being the case for all the words of which it is
composed, each taken by itself. (SF: 222)
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Indeed, Vailati thought that many of philosophy's own central
words also cannot be "defined" directly, but rather than this being
a license to inflate concepts and theories to no end, pragmatism
entails a kind of radical surgery while admitting all the time an
open-ended development of theories and explanatory concepts
sufficiently flexible and creative to deal with an ever-changing
and evolving experience, both individual and social. These are
themes developed in Vailati's essays "11linguaggio come ostacolo
alla eliminazione di contrasti illusori" (SF: 325-30) and "II pragmatismo e i vari modi di non dir niente" (SF: 347-57).
The pragmatic maxim was formulated by Vailati, echoing
Peirce, in the following way in his essay "Le origini e l'idea fondamentale del pragmatismo" (SF: 331-46):
the sole means to determine and to clarify the sense of an assertion
consists in indicating what particular experiences one intends with
it to affirm will be produced or would be produced, given certain
circumstances [iZsolo mezzo di determinare e chiarire il senso di una
asserzioneconsiste nell'indicarequali esperienzeparticolarisi intenda con
essa affermare che si produrranno, o si produrrebberodate certe circostanze]. (SF: 331)
These experiences, however, are by no means subjective. The
whole point of the maxim is to make assertions more objective
by subjecting them to a set of constraints and controls. Assertions
refer essentially to "anticipations or previsions of all sorts" [aspettazioni o previsioni di qualsiasi specie] (SF: 335), and this, Vailati
shows in an illuminating analysis of some points from Berkeley's
Theory of Vision, applies even to the beliefs about present facts or
to facts that have already occurred:
In his Theory of Vision-which is really a true and authentic theory
of "prevision"-Berkeley, in opposition to the current opinion according to which the size, position, and distance of objects would
be seen by us in the same way that we see their color, showed
how our visual sensations are, by themselves, simply incapable of
furnishing us immediately with such types of information, and that
the distances, the forms, the dimensions of the objects that we see
are not "seen" by us but "foreseen," or inferred by the symptoms
or signs of them that our visual sensations, in the real sense of the
term, furnish us with.
The distances, the forms, the dimensions are, that is, in a certain
sense, read and interpreted by us in a process analogous to that
with which we manage to read and to interpret any other species
of "signs" 3 ; we can be said, for example, to see the genius or the
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stupidity of a person when we read something they have written.
(SF: 335)

Berkeley's esse est percipireally means esse est possepercipi(SF:
336). Vailati accepts this "semiotic" analysis as equivalent to a
"pragmatic" analysis. The existence or non-existence of a thing
boils down to the possible existence of determinate experiences
(SF: 336), which can come to us or which we can provoke by our
voluntary actions. 4 These previsioni are contained in our beliefs
and do not have to be actualized or made explicit except in cases
when our beliefs are interrupted or we fall into doubt. Vailati is
here, as in many other places, a faithful interpreter and presenter
of the Peircean theses, pointing out the wide range of consequences that flow from accepting the pragmatic axiom and seeing
how we can assimilate it to a semiotic analysis of perception, a
topic Peirce never ceased to deal with in great detail on his own.
3. THE LINGUISTIC DIMENSION IN VAILATI'S WORK

Vailati never ceased to occupy himself with language as a
philosophical problem. On the one hand, his approach was informed through and through by the rhetoric of suspicion 5 (and
the suspicion of rhetoric), and this brought him into close proximity to Nietzsche, Peirce, Lady Welby, and Wittgenstein in particular. Vailati's approach, however, is Socratic rather than Nietzschean or Freudian or Marxist. Philosophy was to put us on our guard
against pseudo-distinctions and pseudo-abstractions and show us
"how to make our ideas clear," that is, reveal the ultimate conditions of linguistic meaning (and non-meaning), traced by Vailati
to pragmatic conditions. On the other hand, philosophical reflection on language had also a descriptive and a constructive task:
to perform a phenomenological inventory of our language forms
and concepts and to delineate the various logical grammars of our
expressive means . I want to focus here, though not exclusively,
on the latter task, as exemplified in two substantial and fresh
essays, "I tropi della logica," which, with a semantic orientation,
deals with metaphors of mental processes, and "La grammatica
dell' algebra," which, in the syntactic mode, examines the structure
of algebra from the linguistic point of view.
"I tropi della logica" (SF: 195-203) is not only a piece of substantive language-analytical philosophizing in its own right, but
it also points ahead to and compares favorably with the type of
analyses undertaken much later by Wittgenstein and Ryle, within
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the tradition of analytic philosophy, and by George Lakoff and
Mark Johnson in recent years in their provocative discussions of
the ubiquity of metaphor and of metaphorical constructions of
"the mind. " 6
Taking deduction [il dedurre],the logical operation par excellence, as his object of analysis, Vailati asks whether we de facto
schematize it according to diverse images and, if so, what they
are. Answering in the positive to the first question, Vailati distinguishes three root metaphors, each of which represents one aspect, or system of aspects, of this paradigmatic "processomentale":
1) appoggiolsostegno[support/prop], 2) contenere/includere[containing/including], and 3) salire!scendere[ascending/descending].
The first group of metaphors focuses on the classical role of
deduction as "a means of making our knowledge certain" [un
mezzo di accertamentodelle nostre cognizioni]. But, on the classical
view, certitude is dependent on the certitude of the premises, to
which the conclusion is attached by a thread ffilo] of argument.
Certitude is transmitted in a straight line, so to speak, from premises to conclusions. It literally "depends" on the premises, hangs
from them. Greek science, logic, and geometry shared the same
ideal of deductive system and gave cognitive priority to the system
of premises, axioms, or postulates from which the process of
deduction started out (the theme of "Il metodo deduttivo ... ").
The validity of the premises and their mutual coherence came
either from their self-evidence or from the fact that they did not
give rise to contradictory conclusions. At the same time, however,
the images of "appoggio"or "sostegno" define a schema of "support," of premises as the "base" or "foundation" upon which the
conclusions "rest." Greek thought was obsessed with the problem
of foundations, especially in deductive systems, where, it was
thought, the ideal of the human mind was most exemplified.
While, to be sure, deduction was a process, and hence a development in time, it was the completedprocess, as exemplified in a
unified set of properly related propositions, that the Greeks most
admired. Hence, Plato's praise of geometry, the cultural influence
of Euclid's elements, and so forth, in spite of Aristotle's own
contributions to rhetoric and what is now called informal logic.
Vailati points out that this image does not correspond to the
new view of deduction as it has been revealed in the rise of modern
mechanics and in modern mathematical logic. Premises and conclusions are joined together by "mutual attraction," mutual dependency. The process of deduction is likened to a group of Alpinisti
joined together by a rope (SF: 199). Deduction is much more like
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an explication [spiegazione]than a demonstration [dimostrazione]in
modern scientific systems, because the premises and axioms have
no permanently privileged status, but play their role within a
constitutional or democratic realm. Going beyond his claim that
induction is "a reasoning process without foundations" [un
ragionamentosenzafondamenti](SF: 374, n4), Vailati would seem to
imply that deduction itself, as it functions within the realm of the
idealizing physical sciences and in modern mathematical logic, is
more a means of discovering just what a theory or set of hypotheses mean, or could imply, with respect to their bearing on experience, than a device for insuring the certitude of a process of
reasoning, or finding a rock-solid base. The aim of modern science
is understanding, not certainty. Here Vailati parallels exactly, it
seems to me, the view of science proposed by Peirce and worked
out by Dewey in his The Quest for Certainty and Logic:The Theory
of Inquiry. Theories are organisms for Vailati, whose parts are
mutually dependent and tied together by intelligible bonds discerned by inferential processes which could begin at any place in
the organism.
The second group of operative metaphors, found in the pair
contenerelincludere
, thinks of conclusions as impliedby premises or
the premises as containedin the conclusion, in fact, explicating the
conclusion that is deduced from it. By relying upon this schematization, Vailati points out that we are led to think of deduction as
the extractionfrom premises of what they already contain, of what
is implicit in them . Deduction is a cognitive movement from the
implicit to the explicit. But what, we might ask, happens to the
cognitive status of the conclusion if it is already "in" the premises?
How is a conclusion "in" its premises? Aristotle tried to answer
this question by having recourse to an analogy based on the contrast between form and matter. Deduction, in his view, is likened
to the work of a sculptor who releases the figure from the block
of marble. Vailati, for his part, modifies, in an enlightening way,
the analogy, by pointing out that the deductive process, so understood within this image schema, should be compared rather to
the production of a lens [lente]or a dagger [pugnale].This shift in
the metaphor illustrates the greater and deeper cultural shift in
the cognitive role of deduction: from the explication of what is
already there to an instrument for seeing, by means of the theory,
what would otherwise be inaccessible (the lens metaphor) or for
penetrating (the dagger metaphor) to the inside. It is in this light
that we are to understand Vailati's comment about "the task of
deduction as the organizing activity of our knowledge in view of
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the attainment of determinate ends, not excluded, it is understood,
that of leading to the quest for acquiring new knowledge" (SF:
200). Hence, deduction has a properly heuristic role to play in the
development and organization of knowledge.
Vailati has a view of deduction as active, contrasting it with
other purely or predominantly passive operations (in his view) of
observation, contemplation, or registration of the data of experience or of intuition. Deduction must be likened to a conscription
[coscrizione]rather than to a census [censimento](SF: 201).
But there is even more to the container image. It allows us
to think of premises as simpler than the conclusions, as, in fact,
the elements out of which the conclusions are composed. It is in
effect a chemical analogy, and is latent even in Euclid's Elements
and in Plato's Theatetus (206-08), where the fundamental principles
of the various sciences are likened to the letters of the alphabet.
In Vailati's view, however, the weakness of the chemical image
is that it exaggerates the role of simple truths over against complex
truths and creates the supreme ideal of scientific research as the
determination of truths absolutely primordial, indecomposable,
atomic [primordiali, indecomponibili, atomiche], "fit to generate all
the others by means of their different groupings" (SF: 201). This
is the Leibnizian ideal that likens truth to numbers.
To this ideal Vailati opposes an essentially pragmatic one.
Simplicity and complexity, he points out, are extremely relative,
depending on the goal of the affirmation, where it is uttered,
weight of the treatment of which it is a part, etc. (SF: 201-02).
Indeed, going further, Vailati argues that whether a proposition
is demonstrable or a concept definable depends, in the one case,
on what premises one accepts or, in the other case, on what other
concepts one supposes as given (SF: 202). It is this shifting nature
of the premises and of the concepts that reveals just how indebted
Vailati is to his study of the history of science.7
The third group of metaphors, based on the image-schema
of ascending/descending
[salire/scendere],encompasses both deduction and definition, the latter of which is often represented as
consisting in the ascent from particular intuitions to more general
concepts under which the particulars fall (SF: 202), an echo, as is
obvious, of the Porphyrian tree. 8 Vailati points out that metaphors
of groups two and three share the notion that deduction involves
passing from the general to the particular and that the upshot of
definition can also be a movement from a more general notion to
a particular notion (SF: 203). Hence, Vailati seems to be himself
thinking in terms of an organism or of a web . These are, it is
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apparent, themselves very powerful metaphors and images.
Comparing the metaphor of rischiaramento [Erkliirung], which
is a light metaphor, with that of salire, Vailati points out that the
latter has the advantage of foregrounding not only seeing, but
commanding and power, "come quando si parla di alture dalle
quali si domina una data regione" [a commanding view] (SF: 203).
There are, it is clear, many different heights, with relative advantages and disadvantages.
These exemplary analyses of the language of the mind, of
those root metaphors that not only pre-structure our pictures of
ourselves but also the procedures we use to structure our world
and to set cognitional goals for ourselves, are heuristically fertile
and permanently valid contributions to the hermeneutics of knowledge and illustrate the power of a linguistic phenomenology to
contribute to an analysis of mental processes.
4. THE GRAMMAR OF ALGEBRA

The principal focus of Vailati's philosophical work was, as
we have seen, twofold: an analysis of the significance of modern
scientific methods and an analysis of the importance of language
for philosophical reflection as a whole. The core of his approach
to language was fundamentally semantic, for it was through the
concepts carried by languages that human beings gained control
over their world and entered into cooperative arrangements in
social life, steering and evaluating both their technical and their
ethical actions with respect to ends in view.
While the analysis exemplified in "I tropi dell logica" is resolutely semantic in orientation and in method, the groundbreaking
essay "La grammatica dell'algebra" (SF: 304-24) offers us a precise
and illuminating comparative account of the syntactic structures
of algebra and natural languages. In it Vailati touches upon issues
dear to general semiotics, whose principal goal is the description,
classification, and comparison of sign systems of every sort.
What does an analysis of algebra, from the "grammatical" or
"language" point of view, tell us?
The foundation of the comparison is that while other sign
systems, such as the ideographic, which bypass phonetic representations may not have "words" in the strict sense of the term,
their elements perform the same functions. These second types
of writing systems utilize alterations in the form, or in the order
of signs, to perform the analogous functions of natural languages
realized by inflexions, prepositions, signs of predication and of
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interrogation, conjunctions, and so forth. Algebra, music, as well
as other ideographic systems, while engaging in a kind of competition with natural languages, resort to various expedients and
have a special character all their own, which, in the case of algebra,
is not to be restricted to the brevity and precision of algebraic
notation with respect to numbers or to quantjties.
Besides its advantage as a means of expression, the language
of algebra, Vailati notes, is advantageous as an instrument of
research and of proof (SF: 305). But, unlike the signs of arithmetic
and music-which
Vailati groups together as "nomenclatures"
rather than languages and whose tasks are the description and
decomposition into their elements of given groups of sensations
or of complex actions-algebra
and its semiotic partner chemical
notation can enunciate true and authentic propositions (that is,
propositions with objective reference) and deduce their consequences (SF: 306).
The first point of comparison focuses on the parts of speech
(SF: 307ft). Vailati agrees with Max Muller that "language begins
where the interjections end" [illinguaggiocominciadove le interiezioni
finiscono] (SF: 307). Interjections are "full" of meaning in themselves and have no syntactic bond with other interjections. This
syntactic bond, Vailati points out, is crucial for the joining of
names, adjectives, verbs, and so forth to make phrases and propositions. Merely mentioning the name of an object, without joining
it to other words in a syntactic matrix, is insufficient to determine
what we intend to say. Vailati was very aware of the necessity of
a syntactic field, in Buhler's sense, or of a linguistic situation, in
Wegener's and Gardiner's sense, wherein the single linguistic
units had to be set in order to do their work. 9
This is extremely clear in the case of prepositions, which
"mean" nothing without the addition of other words (SF: 308).
Thus, "above," "beside," "after," and so forth always open up
what Karl Buhler called Leerstellen,or empty slots, which have to
be filled by other linguistic units. There are nouns and adjectives
that also demand complements in order to signify: "coetaneo"[contemporary of], "compaesano" [fellow countryman of], "maggiore"
[greater than], "posteriore" [following upon] (SF: 309). "Nomi relativi" have a "transitive" character, analogous to the transitive
character of verbs, with which they have the further factor in
common that they can be translated into verbal form. "So and so
is the enemy of such and such" [II tale e nemico del tale altro] or
"this object is higher than another object" [il tale oggetto e piu alto
del tale altro] can be translated into "one person hates another
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person" [latalepersonaodia la talealtra]or" a certain object surpasses,
or goes beyond, another object" [il tale oggettosupera, o sopravanza,
il tale altro], and so forth (SF: 309-10). Vailati explicitly refers to
Peirce's theory of relations: bivalent, trivalent, and so forth (bivalent: insegnare[to teach], maestro[teacher/master], donatore[donor];
trivalent: vendere [to sell], comperare[to buy]) (SF: 310). In plurivalent verbs, which are multiply transitive, the prepositions perform
the role of connecting organs. To be sure, Vailati points out, the
increasing number of "valences" governing the relation of verbs
and complements would lead to ambiguities if there did not appear
on the scene prepositions (or inflections) corresponding to the
diverse "cases" of nouns. Telegraphic speech (addresses, financial
statements, etc.) dispenses with them, however. "Spedite plico segretario" [send the packet to the secretary] is clear by reason of
the semantic content of the words. But in the case of "dico male
di Tizio a Caio" [I am maligning Titius to Caius], "dico male a Caio
di Tizio," the dropping of the prepositions would make the sentences completely ambiguous (SF: 310-11).
Using the above points of reference as his analytical notions,
Vailati subjects algebra to a grammatical analysis.
The first point to note about the special grammatical and
syntactical characters of the language of algebra is the absence of
intransitive verbs (SF: 311). The signs of equality or inequality are
the equivalents of transitive verbs, and without them we have
only "expressioni algebriche,"not propositions. Such algebraic expressions as a+b, axb, a-b [la somma di a con b, il prodotto di a
per b, la differenza tra a e b] are of the same structure as the
linguistic expressions ''l'urto di un corpocon un altro" [the impact
of one body with another], "il disprezzo di una personaper un'altra"
[the denigration of one person by another], "la distanza tra un
punto e un altro" [the distance between one point and another],
and so forth, which function as relative nouns [nomi relativi]. So,
the signs of equality and inequality, with the help of the signs of
operations (addition, subtraction, etc.), exercise not just the functions of bivalent verbs but also those of any number of valences,
and thus are able to express relations between many numbers,
helped by the important device of parentheses (SF: 311-13).
The transitive verb character of algebraic signs is not their
only defining property. They have the property of "syllogistic
transitivity" (SF: 314ft). If, for example, A is a concittadino[fellow
citizen] of B and B is a concittadinoof C, then A is a concittadinoof
C. This is not the case with creditore [creditor]. The verbal signs
of algebra(=,<,>)
have this property. The axiom "two quantities
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equal to a third are equal to one another" is the fundamental
principle of algebra, which has been extended to cover and to
subject to algebraic treatment non-mathematical or non-numerical
relations (SF: 315).
Vailati points out that language often expresses the relation
of two objects to one another by specifying the diverse points of
view in which they are equal, or unequal (SF: 316-17). Two persons
can be "equal in stature," two buildings "equal in height," two
climates "equal in health." While, we-in English and Italian,
say-use the preposition "in," Greek and Latin, for example, use
the accusative and the ablative, respectively. So, such expressions
as sine a= sine b, area ABC= area DEF are the algebraic equivalents
of such sentences as "the stature of person so-and-so is equivalent
to the stature of some other person," and so on (SF: 317).
Algebra also avails itself of implicit definitions. While sine
functions are defined explicitly, areas are defined implicitly, by
"definition by abstractions." Vailati refers to the Greek use of
logos-translated by him as "rapporto"-in Euclid, as in "le tali due
grandezzehanno lo stesso rapporto delletali altre due" or "il rapporto
tra tali due quantita e equale a (o maggiore, o minore di) quello tra
le tali altre due quantita.11 Proportions, then, and proportional relations, exemplify implicit definitions (SF: 317-18).
Transitivity and commutativity do not always go together,
though in th2 case of the definition of equality they do, and also
in the definition of perpendicularity or parallelism. "Divisibility,"
however, does not share this property. That one number is divisible by another does not mean that the other is also divisible by
the first (SF: 318-19).
In definition by abstraction, terms are defined by their use in
expressions or propositions and are not free-standing units. Examples cited by Vailati: giudicarea una data stregua [to judge according
to a certain standard], andare in solluchero [to go into rapture],
avernea iosa [to have something galore), andarea zonzo [to loaf, or
to loiter or to saunter), di primo acchito [at first sight, at once).
Another example: the exchange value of something [il valore di
scambio]is defined in relational rather than absolute terms. But it
is clear that it is the great use of implicit definition in algebra and
mathematics that distinguishes it so clearly from ordinary language (SF: 320).
This inability (or non-necessity) to define explicitly what one
is talking about has, for Vailati, implications far outside the realm
of algebra and mathematics. While the decomposition of concepts
by means of a specification of their elements has a certain useful-

ROBERT E. INN/S

193

ness in pedagogical situations, with which Vailati was much concerned, the term to be defined is perhaps best grasped or taught
through direct observation of the facts or the relations which it is
being used to express, through, that is, paradigmatic examples.
This is also, in Vailati's view, the way of cutting short the interminable discussions on "time," "space," "substance," and the "infinite"
(SF: 321ft).
Algebra uses the aforementioned means-the transitive verbal forms of =, < , >, nouns represented by numbers and variables, operation signs ( +, - , x, ...,..
)-to express isolated propositions. But in algebra, just as in natural language, we form chains
of expressions in order to express relations of dependence or
independence. Natural language uses conjunctions, which perform, with respect to propositions, what prepositions do with
respect to nouns . But unlike natural languages, algebra has need
of only one conjunctive sign to express consequence, represented
by the word "therefore ." In addition to consequence, however,
it needs three other signs: for negation, for conjunction ("and"),
and for disjunction ("or"), which are, of course, coin of the realm
of symbolic logic, too (SF: 322-23).
Vailati clearly saw as one of the tasks of a systematic
philosophy of language to study the "various systems of ideographic notations used in modern science, for example, in
geometry, in chemistry, in kinematics, not to speak of the representational procedures used by geography and the diagrams used
by statistics" (SF: 323).10 In his opinion, the study of "artificial
signs" merits just as much attention as the study of the signs of
"natural" languages that have been adapted to different ends and
sharpened by many voluntary and individual factors.
Vailati closes his essay with some further reflections on the
pedagogical implications of what he has tried to do. The emphasis
on explicit definition in both the teaching of languages and the
teaching of algebra is deleterious. Both should be grounded in
exercises of interpretation and conversation. Here is, Vailati
thinks, a real chance for mutually beneficial exchange between
the two putatively separate domains, the literary and the scientific.
Vailati has clearly shown that algebra has a grammar and a
syntax, which systematizes a set of elements that correspond to
the linguistic elements of nouns, transitive verbs, conjunctions,
and prepositions . Implicit definition, or definition by abstraction,
is the rule in algebra. As a study of relations it proceeds best by
paradigmatic example, by exemplification. In fact, from the
pedagogical side, algebra and the teaching of language have much
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in common, for they are most successful when they do not rely
on explicit definitions, but on the strategy of forcing the "seeing
of connections," in Wittgenstein's sense. Hence, in this essay, as
well as in many others, Vailati has produced a piece of comparative, general semiotics and a piece of pedagogical advice at the
same time.
5. PHILOSOPHY AND THE RHETORIC OF SUSPICION

By foregrounding "the unconscious subjection of thought to
language in the various fields of intellectual activity" [l'inconscia

schiavitu del pensieroalla parolanei vari campi d'attivita intellettuale]
(SF: 117), Vailati anticipated, in spirit and in content, much later

work in the language-analytic tradition. While the analysis found
in "I tropi della logica" is a kind of linguistic phenomenology and
that found in "La grammatica dell'algebra" belongs to comparative
semiotics, many of Vailati's essays and reviews belong to the
critique of language and to the problem space of the rhetoric of
suspicion.
Vailati's analysis of this theme, which runs through his work
from start to finish, is illuminated quite clearly by an analogy with
which he begins his essay "11 linguaggio come ostacolo alla
eliminazione di contrasti illusori" (SF: 325-30). Just as we are born
into a society we have not created and are subjected to its rules,
obligations, and rights, so our assimilation of a language as a
system of distinctions and classifications strictly limits, as well as
makes possible, our field or power of expression. Vailati notes that
Galileo had to fight, for example, against the obstacles embedded
in traditional language--distinctions between natural and violent
movement, between terrestrial and celestial phenomena, between
naturally heavy and naturally light bodies, between essentially
hot and essentially cold bodies, between intrinsically good and
intrinsically bad conductors of heat, and so forth (SF: 326). These
distinctions, with all their conceptual baggage, belonged to that
traditional "rete" inherited by Galileo, the freeing from which, at
least partially, was necessary for him to create the new science of
mechanics . The "linguaggiocomune" and the "linguaggioordinario"
(SF: 327) contained also the results of past theoretical decisions,
which had to be reformed. Both science itself and philosophy were
to perform this task. In fact, the critical function of philosophy
arises at this point and gives to Vailati's work on language, at
least in this respect, its distinctively "Socratic" character. This is
evident in the following pregnant text.
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That part especially of philosophy that has as its object the analysis
and criticism of the fundamental concepts and criteria of knowing
and acting demands to be, so to say, rethought in every succeeding
generation; otherwise it runs the risk of losing all its efficacy and
of ending up damaging, rather than helping, those who undergo
in a passive way its influence.
The processes that lead to the elimination of the distinctions that
are gradually coming to be recognized as superfluous or unjustifiable are no less necessary for the healthy development of scientific
and philosophical thought than is, for the life of the body, the normal and non-interrupted activity of the organs of secretion. (SF:328)

This is truly an "eliminative" conception of philosophy, but unlike
certain strands of analytic philosophy, Vailati did not think that
philosophy as such would pass away once it had resolved or
dissolved the knots in our understanding that linguistic problems
or scientific problems have produced. For the descriptive role of
philosophy, its task of reflecting upon the logical grammars of
our various means of expression, is never repudiated by Vailati,
who, in this respect, remains a critical pragmatist.
In his essay "11pragmatismo e i vari modi di non dir niente"
(SF: 347-57), Vailati illustrated the nature and scope of his critical
pragmatism . It is truly a "language-critical essay," paralleling
many of analytic philosophy's procedures as well as its tone. In
this essay Vailati classified four types of propositions as "not saying anything": 1) those that have become "true by definition" (as
when originally synthetic propositions have been transformed
into analytic propositions: e.g., the transformation of the law of
inertia into a conventional axiom); 2) those that have become "false
by definition"; 3) those that have been constructed within a "processo di generalizzazione"whose role as means for given logical or
practical ends has been forgotten; 4) those that take for an explanation propositions that merely reformulate other propositions

(opium facit dormire quia habet virtutem dormitivam-Comte's
"metaphysical explanations").
Terms such as "tagliarenel vuoto" [to cut in the void] (SF:213)
and "spostamento"[shifting, Vailati's own English word] show the
affinity between Vailati's inner motivation and the trajectory instantiated in Wittgenstein's work. Language for Vailati can "spin
its wheels" and" go on holiday ." One part of Vailati' s philosophical
effort is to determine just when this is so, so that the various
knots and entanglements of our intellect in language can be cut
and unloosed . In this, philosophy would be oriented to diminishing distinctions, to clearing the linguistic thicket, to opening a
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space wherein real sense can be expressed and controlled. Another
part of Vailati's effort is to "fare aumentare le distinzioni" [to cause
distinctions to increase]. This is necessary in order to do justice
tc, the reality coming to articulation in the language, which otherwise might be cloaked by a defective articulation. Distinctions,
then, are not only resolved in philosophy but also generated.
In his essay "La caccia alle antitesi" (SF: 210-19), Vailati
specifies three types of procedures for generating and resolving
distinctions and tries to show that the attack often does not abolish
a distinction, but establishes it in a different context and framework,
with a different theoretical bite.
The first approach holds that there is no precise line of demarcation between the groups of facts presumed to be distinct and
that one passes from the one to the other by means of intermediate
stages or gradations. But in this case, Vailati points out, distinctions are actually multiplied. The discussion of determinism and
contingency, for example, exemplifies this category and avails
itself of this procedure.
The second approach contends that the properties that are
supposed to be distinct are possessed by both classes, or by neither
of them. This approach, Vailati notes, only succeeds in putting
in better light the distinct properties, as happened in the case of
those who criticized the notion of cause. Sometimes the iine of
demarcation is shifted (spostamento) [spostamentodolle distinzioni],
or one adds a second line of demarcation to it, or one just segments
the field, as in the distinction between apparenza (fenomeno) and
realta (essenza, noumeno). Such is also the distinction between
egoism and altruism. Discussions about the differences between
quantity and quality belong here.
The third procedure of attempting to abolish distinctions is
exemplified in the erroneous tendency to "interpret a phrase that
expresses a relation among many objects as if it had to have a
meaning for each one of them taken separately" (SF: 215). Another
example is the case of the law of inertia in mechanics, which only
makes sense when we specify the spatio-temporal references
within which the uniform rectilinear movement of a body occurs.
Inertia in itself does not exist any more than the application of
the term "antecedent" or "successor" to numbers is an absolute
ascription. The same number can be both, just as a city can be
both "east" and "west."
So, for Vailati, philosophy is caught between the two poles
of generating and abolishing distinctions. In this sense it is a
linguistic exercise that straddles the fence between the Scholastic
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maxim of distingue frequenter, which pursues the path of differences, and the traditional philosophical task of finding general
concepts, universals, the absolute.
Philosophy, as practiced by Vailati, is an activity that forms
and cultivates the critical powers of the person engaged in it,
generating new mental habits. Its focus is a reflection upon cognitive methods, a clarification of concepts, a determination of the
conditions of sense, both linguistic and non-linguistic. Vailati's
work encompassed historical epistemology, linguistic phenomenology, comparative semiotics, and a sense-critical pragmatic analysis.
Rejecting the road of oracular and monological philosophy, Vailati
embedded philosophy in the web of cultural discourse as a whole,
with which it intersected, both theoretically and practically, at just
about every point. And it is this comprehensiveness, combined with
an authentic modesty about philosophy's powers, that makes Vailati' s work a model for us as well as a permanent source of insight.
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